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Technology and the
Relationship between
Modernityand Postmodernity

Renato Barilli

In order to resolve the complicated question of the relationship
between modernity and postmodernity, I have for some time
stressed the usefulness, if not the necessity, of acknowledging
the wisdom of historical periodization found in textbooks, which
we were accustomed to from our school days-at least those of
us of the older generations, when learning was less methodical
and one studied by rote the dates and events that were deemed
most important. According to these textbooks, the modern era
corresponds to the period between the second half of the fifteenth
century and the end of the eighteenth century-after which follows the era known as "contemporary," indicated by a word of
such extreme generality that it becomes confused at every turn
with its predecessor, the modern. Why not replace it, then, with
the newborn term of postmodern, no less equivocal if you will,
but capable of explicitly indicating the relationship of succession
to the modern?
What isn't acceptable in the traditional periodization is the
concept of history which informs them: a kind of history entirely
[Translatedfrom the Italian by Nelson Moe]
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reliant upon superficial facts and epiphenomena, connected to
battles, diplomatic events, the births and deaths of great men. The
modern era, for example, presumably starts with the fall of Constantinople, or with the battle of Lepanto (the second half of the
fifteenth century), or with 1492, the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent, as well as the discovery of America. The modern era's tenninus
ad quernwould be given by the beginning of the French Revolution,
or by the Congress of Vienna, which would at the same time be
the terminus ad quo for the beginning of the contemporary era (or
postmodern era, if one accepts what I proposed above).
Against these "weak" historiographical criteria, plotted on
the surface, it seems correct to stress the exigencies of a "strong"
historiography, directed towards the search for transformations
occurring at a greater depth, capable of operating at the structural
level. I personally have employed for two decades a methodology
which is based upon cultural historical materialism; materialism
because it works from the presupposition that at some originary
level there is an interaction between man and the environment
(natural and social), and that this interaction above all depends
upon material channels, material practices-the activities of working, of producing, of constructing defenses against the various
threats of organic and inorganic forces. Man, however, is that
particular animal which in his interactions with nature is capable
of using cultural instruments, that is to say, which is capable of
extending his limbs, the natural qualities of his organism, with
the adoption of external, extra-organic, artificial instruments. And
these adoptions, these prostheses, are transformed with the passage of time, through processes of innovation. For this reason we
are dealing with a materialism which is at once historical and
cultural.
But understood in this manner, culture is nothing save what
we usually understand by the term technology, that is the system
of instrumental adoptions which humanity, in a determinate stage
of its evolution and in a certain habitat, acquires and makes use
of. And so the methodology which I appeal to can be defined
equally well, and perhaps even more eloquently, as a technological
historical materialism. With this, however, the aim is not to entirely overthrow the reciprocal and hierarchical material relationships between "high" and "low" culture, to abjure previous mental
habits according to which the term culture meant a set of ideas,
of noble operations, either purely mental (the sciences) or connected to refined and aristocratic crafts (the arts). If before the
concept of culture as an ensemble of instrumental practices, as
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an excercise of crafts [tecniche],was mistakenly displaced, I do not
propose now that these take absolute precedence, establishing a
bond of deterministic subordination with regard to ideal-mental,
or, more precisely, symbolic activities. Every sufficiently large and
organic cultural system exists at both levels, the low and high,
each taking nourishment from the other as if in a process of feedback. Basic technological changes are, in fact, the result of lengthy
processes of study, experimentation, research, which occur in the
"superior" and apparently pure, disinterested sectors of the sciences. But these in turn cannot escape the final goal of an eventual
translation of their results into the concrete materiality of some
technological innovation, an innovation which changes concrete
modes of working, producing, transporting. If sooner or later the
"ideas" or symbolic operations do not find an outlet of this kind,
they remain suspended in limbo and are finally swept away, relegated to some dead corner of the history of ideas.
To put it differently, within a given cultural system, contributions originating in various ideas of activity and research (technology, science, art) are to be considered "equals," intervening at
the same level, capable of entering into dialogue with one another,
with continual exchanges (in describing this I often resort to the
simile of communicating "receptacles"). It is difficult to grant logical or chronological precedence to a specific area, for an innovation can start out from any point in the system: it may be the
artistic sector, or-and why not?-the culinary, or that of transportation, which allows for the maturation of a new instrumental use
which then spreads, from receptacle to receptacle, permitting the
system to reach the same level everywhere-that
is, similes aside,
to adjust in each sphere to the new logic which emerged first in
pioneering forms in some outpost. And yet to the "receptacle"
marked with the label of technololgy-and
in its most obvious
and tangible manifestations, bound that is to modes of working,
producing, transporting-we
must, in spite of everything, grant
a certain precedence, neither logical nor chronological, but rather
of a quantitative nature, of mass, of visibility, and therefore also
of representability of a nominal order, that is, as a kind of standardbearer. Needing therefore to find a name or title in order to map
out the various systems which have emerged in the history of
culture, how can we resist the temptation-or the good sense-of
charting them according to their most prominent, apparent, tangible manifestation, that of technology?
In keeping with the above considerations, then, the modern
era fundamentally becomes the era of machines and, in particular-
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from the name of the most prominent and tangible machine, the
moveable printing press, and even more so from the name of its
mythical inventor-it becomes the Gutenberg era, or to say it with
Marshall McLuhan, the Gutenberg Galaxy. This certainly does
not mean that typography was, even chronologically, the first
machine to appear on the scene. McLuhan himself takes pains to
show us that the printing press was preceded by a "machine"
which was active at the secondary, superior, "high" or symbolic
level-or however one wishes to describe the perspective based
upon the schema of the visual pyramid: a schema already widely
applied by Masaccio in the Cappella Brancacci (at the end of the
1430s) and formulated in 1432 by Leon Battista Alberti in his De
pictura. Thus "high" culture is not determined by the "low," but
rather almost always precedes it, shows it the way, assumes,
literally, an avant-garde role in relation to it-an avant-gardism
which, however, is confirmed and legitimated only if the main
corps of the army sooner or later is able to follow, to occupy en
masse and with force the positions that the platoons sent upon
exploratory missions had merely sighted, lacking the force to establish definitive control over them. Naturally, apart from the
analogy, the cultural historian has to demonstrate that there is
actually an homology between the perspective machine and the
typographic machine, that there is an identity of functions, even
if on different levels and for different ends; and that these are
truly communicating receptacles, that is, that the metaphoric liquid of the circulation of forms, of logical solutions, actually reaches
the same level, respects a single functional criterion. But supposing that such an homology is proven, it will then be difficult to
restrain ourselves from calling the entire solid system by the name
of the largest, most capacious receptacle. McLuhan in fact didn't
hesitate to speak precisely of a Gutenberg Galaxy; it didn't occur
to him instead to propose to us an Alberti Galaxy-and there
would in any case have been competition between the other possible candidates for that eponymous position: Massaccio, Piero
della Francesca, Leonardo, Diirer ....
Let's now consider that other great epochal cycle regarding
the last two centuries: the contemporary era-according to the
textbooks-or the postmodern era, if the terminological correction
I have proposed is accepted. Clearly we will want to try extending
to this period too the same method of technological historical
materialism, which means that for it too we shall have to find a
technological "receptacle" of great power, capable of gathering
around itself a network of other, cooperative, synergetic recepta-
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des. Again McLuhan offers us a valid suggestion on this front,
calling to mind the appearance of electromagnetism-a
technological, scientific, and, more generally, cultural innovation which was
achieved in different stages quite distant from one other (as happened by the way with the preceding modern cycle of machines-a
decisive point I'll return to shortly). Thus, at the end of the
eighteenth century, electromagnetism was merely a scientific
curiosity, that is, at that very point where we are supposed to
locate the break between the modern and postmodern era. Electromagnetism at most creates some disturbance in the "high"
areas of the most sophisticated culture, with almost no influence
at the practico-material level. One must wait nearly a century
(until the 1860s) in order to find effective technological results
from the discoveries brought about from electrology in the pure
arena of experimental science-such
as Pacibotti' s ring-with
which electromagnetism replaces thermal energy in procuring
mechanical labor, that is, essentially, in powering machines. The
beginnings of electromagnetism are moreover the stage of a union,
of an honorable compromise-as
the term itself indicates-between these two profound logics. At the same time it is worth
adding that in that same decade the laying of the great transatlantic
telegraphic cables takes place, with which electronics takes a step
forward in assuming principal responsibility in the sector of communications. The "wireless telegraph" soon follows, the decisive
step which in more concrete ways brings about the take-off of our
era known also, not coincidentally, as the era of "techtronics."
This, then, in summary, is my proposal, macroscopic, elementary, scholastic: that the two great eras, modern and postmodern,
are divided from one another just as the textbooks tell us, but
that each is related to a "strong" foundation, traced at least at the
eponymous level to the technologies which have most consistently
shaped them: machinism and electromagnetism
Why does such an elementary and clear proposition cause
astonishment and have difficulty in finding adherents? Certainly
the inevitable reasons for the disconcertment and incredulity
which always accompany propositions of too radically an innovative nature, especially if based on weak foundations, can be attributed to a critical framework lacking substantial philological proof:
it's too good to be true. But among the most persistent difficulties
we must also rank the fact that our recourse to the technological
factor cannot neatly divide the various historical phases from one
another. Whether one speaks of the cycle of machines or that of
electromagnetism and its off-shoots, it is inevitable that we take
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into consideration processes with much slower tempos, and with
diverse side-effects, characterized also by mutual interferences,
or better yet, by interpenetrations and superimpositions. Expressed in simpler terms, there are aspects of modernity which continue well into territories which should chronologically belong to
postmodernity. This without doubt stacks the deck, prohibits us
from playing the cards in a "straight," univocal fashion. The temptation even arises to think that the modern and postmodern are
not epochal distinctions, related, that is, to historical-chronological
complexes, but rather categorical differences, almost historical
polarities to be viewed in their synchronic consistency instead of
in a diachronic succession. In effect, the long phases of synchronic
cohabitation side by side temper, if not oppose, their relationship
of reciprocal, diachronic exclusion.
Let's try now to follow a bit more closely the several successive
phases through which the machinism proper to the modern era
has been articulated. According to the McLuhanesque historiographical framework which I have adopted, we would observe
its first appearance in the fifteenth century, tied to the synergy
between two machines, the "high" one of perspective (perspective
as symbolic form, goes the title of one of Panofsky' s most famous
works) and the base-material one of typography. But machinism
would seem then to have had a lengthy period of latency, finding
itself surrounded by a technological universe still regulated by
'"machines" fundamentally powered by animal energy, machines
proper to the classical and medieval eras, or in any case to a phase
which is certainly premodern. We have to wait until the seventeenth century to find the introduction of machinelike devices
at the "high," epistemological, scientific level (in Cartesian
rationalism, for example, not so distant in effect from Anglo-Saxon
empiricism, to which it is conjoined, homologous, intercommunicating on the basis of a common element, an insurmountable
dualism). Only at the end of the eighteenth century do machines
in the real sense of the word arrive on the scene, powered by
thermal energy and capable of setting off productive and locomotive processes which can be termed fully and distinctively modern.
Here then we have a highly disturbing element with respect to
the proposed periodization. For the modern era would seem to
enter its most mature phase of development, aided by the structural support of the technological practices of the day, just when
we should be pronouncing its end and passage from the scene in
favor of a contrary principle.
And yet that is precisely what happens: the various epochs
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in a certain sense have a porous interior, enabling them to invade
one another. One epoch can play its first chords, announce its
distinctive leitmotif, when the other is far from having achieved
its maximum level of orchestration. In this regard the analogy in
terms of galaxies offered by McLuhan is worth recalling: the interior
of each of these is characterized by a high level of rarefaction, so
that it is possible to belong to one of them without even being
aware of it. It appears to us that we belong to the Milky Way even
as we maintain a relationship of exteriority to it, almost as distant
spectators; and double affiliations are possible as well, membership in two galaxies which in large part interpenetrate one another.
Let us say then that the hundred years between the end of
the eighteenth and the end of the nineteenth century are like a
vast neutral territory, a battlefield in which modernity and postmodernity meet and clash with one another, corning into ambiguous relationships of cohabitation of exclusion. Modernity, at the
level of technology, and that is in terms of a real "machine civilization," has yet to take off when electromagnetism appears on
the scene, unable however of achieving anything for the moment
at an effective material level. There is thus an exchange of prerogatives: modernity is already in its adulthood, if not senility, with
respect to its symbolic forms, its ideational processes (philosophy,
literature, art), and in such conditions is ready to try out the new
suggestions which the mysterious continent of electrology offers
it. This responds moreover to the consummation of that enormous
disturbance which goes by the vague and ambiguous name of
Romanticism. Romanticism, however, is too far ahead of its times,
lacking in sufficient support from a technological base (can you
imagine, this technology still has to go through the entire cycle
of machinery!) and is therefore destined to dry up, vanishing like
an early spring.
In this way we can understand why the middle decades of
the nineteenth century evolve entirely under the sign of modernity: at the low-material level there is the complete triumph of
mechanical production (mechanical-textile industries, locomotion,
then the compression engine); at the high-symbolic level we witness the rehabilitation of renaissance perspective (perfectly illusory and specular, allowed to follow and achieve the objective of
the "open window"), which momentarily takes back the terrain
lost through the disturbing avant-gardist experimentations of
Fiiseli, Blake, Goya, Flaxman. . .. Instead we find the grand chapter of realism-naturalism, which flows happily and ponderously
until its logical outcome in Impressionism: a chapter which is
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wholly inspired by the rules of modernity.
Beginning in the 1860s the roles tend to be reversed, in the
sense that modernity is no longer the dominant force at every
level. Postmodernity becomes a certainty even in the material
sphere of technology, no longer limited to that of avant-gardist
anticipations, risky by nature, provided by those active in the
sphere of symbolic forms. In that moment both electromechanics
and electronics gather substantial momentum, as I noted above,
destined to grow continuously and to restrict the room for maneuver of mechanical-type technology. And at the same time
homologous solutions articulated by artists, writers and
philosophers appear with equal clarity. I have insisted on numerous other occasions on reading the early Cezanne as a perfect, if
unaware, traveling companion of the incipient electronic revolution, determined to abolish Albertian perspective and replace it
with a conception of curvilinear space, or, better (given the suitability of using solid figures in order to express multidimensinality),
of a space that can be likened to a spheroid, where the very bodies
present themselves alternately in enlargement and shrinkage, as
if they were the successive contractions and expansions of a wave
movement, thus offering an effective visualization of electromagnetic waves. The members of a later generation, headed by
Gauguin, who was just barely the youngest brother of the Impressionists, insisted on relying upon a system of that kind, curvilinear,
sinuous, rounded-off, borrowing models of a more subterranean
nature, given that they were not yet lucid and aware enough to
borrow them from electromagnetism itself, barely understanding
the intimate link between artistic propositions and technological
devices. And thus we have all the typical styles of the fin-de-siecle
(Symbolism, Art Nouveau, Liberty, Jugendstil, in large part convergent with one another), which in turn takes up motifs analogous to the ones which had appeared in the previous fin-de-siecle,
in Fiiseli, Blake or Flaxman, demonstrating that we have a later
point on the same trajectory, or the return of a leitmotif which
reappears with heightened intensity as it succeeds in detaching
itself more cleanly from other competing, if not antithetical, motifs.
But the dispute between the modern and postmodern was
far from finding a definite resolution, which shows all the more
how the question involves phases which penetrate one another,
even if in varying degrees. And the case of Cezanne demonstrates
this perfectly. In fact, the interpretation which sees in Cezanne a
forerunner of the postmodern and of its morphology based on
the fluid, the wavelike, the sinuous, and so forth, is verified by
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his youthful paintings, those precisely of the decade we discussed
above, 1860-70. Immediately afterward, the proven~al painter undergoes a structural conversion which leads him to adopt his
noted multifaceted, segmented, splintered style, in which an anticipation of Cubism is evident, or a least the laying down of an
axis of continuity which leads to the solutions which Picasso and
Braque will reach in 1907-08. Thus the partisans of a modernity
which finds its elective location in the twentieth century can draw
from this facet a valid element of support. This is confirmed too
by parallel developments in the field of technology, where, at the
beginning of this century, systems of mechanical production are
far from becoming obsolete. Heavy industry, rather, is yet destined to know great cycles of expansion, until the last, most complete and intense of them all-the cycle following World War II,
and particularly during the sixties, which corresponds to the
period of our so-called boom and of an advanced industrial society
based on consumerism, on the abundant flow of commodities.
It is therefore nearly inevitable that in homology with these
pronouonced cycles of expansion of an industrialism based on
machines powered by thermal energy, by hydrocarbons (or also
by electromagnetic energy, produced however by power plants
running off thermal energy, which therefore doesn't greatly affect
this point), there should be phases of "mechanomorphic" art. In
this sense Cubism is central, becoming also the point of diffusion
for analogous movements (Dutch Neoplasticism, Constructivism,
Russian Supremism, and in part Italian Futurism), and worthy of
nomination as the "modern" style par excellence. And this -remains
true even if it is possible to assert that Cubism had already accepted
a certain postmodern inheritance insofar as it had freed itself from
reliance upon the system of renaissance perspective. In fact the
cubes and other solid figures-simulated
through graphic or pictorial means or even directly presented as autonomous plastic
concrete objects-are not subjected to the framework of the visual
pyramid, conditioned by the singularity both of the point of view
and the vanishing point. And so much less are they tributaries
of the Cartesian axes, but rather are freely positioned in a multidimensional space, a space which is plural and discontinuous,
heterogeneous, anisotropic, and so forth. Basically, we can say
that "mechanomorphism," even while present in evident and tangible forms in Cubism and related styles, is nothing but a sheet
of surfaces there where the underlying logic traces itself in spirals,
energetic movements, loose dynamisms. It too, therefore, inherits
the legacy of the early Cezanne, and it is worth noting that Cezanne
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himself in his mature period, with its dihedral forms, by no
means abrogates that earlier fluidity but only frames it in a more
rigid fashion, without, however, changing its basic significance.
The fact remains that the grammar of "point-line-surface," of
an assembly of strictly geometric forms, be they flat or solid, seems
to have won the contest in the first decades of this century, moved
also by a coherent, expansive thrust aimed at affecting every corner
of the social world and at extending its vocabulary in every direction. In effect, the radical movements were not so much the ones
in the field of painting as those who continued and propagated
their work in the applied and macro-instrumental sectors of architecture. Gropius and Bauhaus, and Russian Constructivism in
more or less direct correspondence with the October Revolution,
are its beneficiaries, its convinced, zealous and systematic proselytizers. And it is not by chance that climate received the trademark
of the Modern Movement par excellence, that is, in its most intensive and pregnant manifestation, leaving a legacy which would
be drawn upon even after the ruins of World War II, carried over,
almost without continuity, into the last phase of expansion of
heavy industry in the 1960s which I referred to above.
It is true that the antagonistic forces of postmodernity (read: of
a more or less conscious and explicit homology with electromagnetism and electronics) by no means stood still with their hands
at their sides but, rather, returned each blow. In this regard the
role of the Italian Futurists stands out. They were ambiguous and
uncertain as to whether they should follow the steps of the older
French Cubists and make use of dihedral figures, or whether
rather to develop a morphology of solid forms deriving from the
rotation of curved lines. In practice, Boccioni and his companions
offered a compromise between these opposing, though conspiring, vital forces. And jumping ahead to the next and bolder step
taken by Dadaism, and above all by Duchamp, it is worth noting
that this step consisted in discovering the possibility of doing
without solid and material bodies, confronting instead the realm
of ideas and thoughts, of linguistic practices, in which the importance of the signifier (the physical base of the communicative
process) diminishes in relation to the importance of the signifieds
put into play. We find then the perspective which, to say it with
one of Lyotard's favorite terms, leads to the progressive and irresistible triumph of the "immaterial," in perfect collaboration
with a technology which gradually abolishes the tools of paperbased, typographic documentation as it increasingly relies on
tapes, records, optic fibers, computers. In this sense the Ducham-
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pian revolution responds best to the spirit of postmodernity, is
that which represents it, enacts it in the most incisive and direct
manner-and
in years much closer to our own, the need will be
felt to take it up again and to extend it. In fact, when it was first
proposed during the 1920s and 1930s, it seems not to have been
understood very well, or had difficulty in establishing itself in a
complex force field in which, as I noted above, the offensive of
the Modern Movement was under way. Even other forces which
were open to the electromorphic tendency diluted it with elements
of naturalism-a nature that was profound and cellular, as if under
microscopic slides, which at that time was cultivated by a line of
expressionism beginning with Kandinsky and culminating with
the more automatic and gestural Surrealists like Masson and Mir6.
It thus happened that the bold Duchampian Dadaism had to wait
until the late sixties, and precisely until the mythical 1968, for it
to experience a phase of expansion, of the conquest of power (at
the level of free experimentation), that is, in order to enjoy what
I term a process of normalization and of widespread implementation, which is without doubt what such phenomena as Italian Arte
povera,or Land Art, Body Art and above all conceptual art were.
These last assertions merit some additional commentary. And
at the same time we must have the courage to state that there is
nothing more profoundly homologous to the postmodern than
Dada itself, above all in the rigorous and subtle version of it
practiced by the author of the Grande Vetro; and this is because
the passage from matter to energy, from inert bodies to undulating
phenomena of irradiation, are its central, distinctive characteristic.
For some time I have called this absolutely constitutive ganglion
an "explosion," with the obvious metaphoric-but
not only
metaphoric-connotations
that point both to phenomena of a
rough, macroscopic, ballistic nature and to those of microphysics,
or of particle physics, taken in turn on a vaster scale from those
of astrophysics. There was then an "explosion" which occurred
more than half a century ago, immediately contained, limited by
antagonistic forces, so that its definitive, full effects were achieved
only recently, after 1968 and during the seventies. In this context
we could proffer a minimal definition of postmodernism, taking
it as a symptom of phases of this kind, of retarded, "autumnal"
diffusion, tremendously long and drawn-out, but with greatly
reduced coefficients of intensity and quality in comparison to the
earlier "historic" phases which appeared on the scene in much
more heroic fashion. If we take a quick glance at the sector of
literary studies, we find that the use of the term postmodern
which has been current in them, above all due to the American
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critic Ihab Hassan, fits well with such a definition. Hassan in fact
considers postmodern writers like Beckett who exasperate, normalize, carry to the extreme, the technical discoveries that
emerged from the historical avant-gardes.
In any case, it is not by chance that I propose the term of
explosion for the radical experimentations conducted by historical
Dadaism; it is a term which dialectically invokes its polar opposite,
implosion, which takes on the obvious connotations offered by
macro- and microphysics as well: implosion as a process in which
energy returns to the condition of matter, to its "mass." The most
surprising and seductive analogy may be the astronomical
phenomenon of black holes, those concentrations of matter so
dense and compact that nothing can escape from their gravitational attraction. Even light, the strongest form of energy known
in our universe, cannot free itself from its fatal embrace-and thus
these whirlpool s of 1natter are "black" or hlincl hy definition.
The pair explosion-implosion irresistibly reminds us of
another, more tried and true polarity proposed by the art historian
Wolfflin, which consists in the noted opposition of open and
closed. And with this we can now see how the postmodern divides
into two equal, while contrary, sides, strictly bound to one another
like the two-faced Janus: on one side the open face of progressive
and uncontainable explosion, at the end of which we no longer
have works of art with a physical consistency, but only conceptual,
"immaterial" processes, in the name of the definitive triumph of
a normalized Dadaism; on the other side, the closed face of implosion, which leads us to the realization that the sphere of artistic
or literary creation is by no means infinite, but on the contrary
quite finite, destined to exhaust itself, at least if we wish to enlarge
it in a linear fashion, by adding new inventions onto those already
recorded. It is instead necessary to come to terms with what we
might call our destiny as astronauts, prisoners of an enormous
black hole which corresponds to the history which has been assembled and recorded in museums, archives, libraries (today there
will increasingly be data banks, nerve centers, depositories of
cassettes and videotapes), constrained to pass again and again
over the stations already visited by humankind, or at least by
different cultures. The only way to save ourselves from the destiny
of epigones, of those who passively repeat, is to maintain-or
better to practically exercise-the clear awareness of such a fate,
thus applying distancing devices, quotation marks, with regard
to the objects we recover.
It is certain that postmodernity, read from this negative, re-
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trospective and, if you will, levorotatory angle,* appears as the
age of revivalisms, of multiple repetitions, of programmatic
citationism. It was like this too in its beginnings, on that fateful
terrain of the late eighteenth century where the premonitory explosions of Turner coexisted side by side with the museumish recoveries of the antique, the archaic, the manneristic of Fiiseli and
company. Similarly, today we shouldn't be surprised if next to
such stubborn champions of the progressive liberation of immaterial energy as Lyotard we find scholars like Jean Clair or Maurizio
Fagiolo (to mention just a few participants at this conference) who
are ready to dive into the historical dimension and appreciate the
periodical "calls to order" that have occurred in the postmodern
era, worthy of attention precisely because they are profoundly
inscribed in the very structural necessities of this era.
But then if, to use Pirandello's expression, "the game's been
understood," it will be wise to avoid pronouncing excommunications or prohibitions. In particular it is necessary to someone like
Jean Clair, who champions a tendency of more or less magical
Realism, not to promote his position, by no means lacking in
legitimacy, in the name of a renunciation of the presumed errors
of modernism: as if there were a sure, solid, classical and traditional manner of making art, of painting, in relation to which
every destabilizing and "explosive" experimentation is viewed as
a step into prevarication and fraud.
As for the rest, if Duchamp can be taken as the legitimate,
eponymous hero of the explosive face of the postmodern, there
is an artist who can be invested with a diametrically opposed role,
Giorgio De Chirico. This juxtaposition eloquently manifests how
the two reigning champions of that dialectical opposition, which
is an essential feature of postmodernism, have their origins in a
quite distant time, in the territory of the historical avant-gardes.
Postmodernism then cannot be viewed as a recent phenomenon,
born yesterday; if anything, what is recent are the phases of its
extensive and normalized expansion. In fact, just as the tendency
of Duchamp has triumphed in the decade of conceptual art, of
the death of art, of performances and happenings, so the legacy
of De Chirico has been affirmed through phenomena like the
New-new, the Anachronists, the Transavantgarde, with the same
*The term used here by Barilli, levogiro,or levorotatory, is defined in the
Random House Dictionary in the following manner: "adj. Optics, Chem., Crystall,
turning to the left, as the rotation of the plane of polarization of light in certain
crystals and compounds; levogyrate" [trans.].
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character of a recovery of diminished intensity, but increased in
frequency and extension.
But if the course I have proposed here is followed, the point
will not be to tag postmodernity with exact and limiting stylistic
labels (what has been articulated here is in fact the most that can
be validly attempted along these lines), but rather to comprehend
the reasons for, and the profound, structural features of this
lengthy epochal complex; after which the consequences, the effects, the manifestations in various areas of the cultural scene will
follow as corollaries.

